Spring and Summer months (corresponding broadly to Quarters 2 and 3) have traditionally been the harshest and most lethal to the NATO/ISAF troops engaged in the Afghanistan war, accounting for respectively 949 and 1,175 coalition deaths from 2001 through 2014. Fall (Quarter 4) comes close with 706 deaths, and Winter (Quarter 1) has been comparatively benign with 655.

In 2010, when US forces were increased by 30,000 elements — the so-called "surge" concocted by former ISAF commander McChrystal and ordered by President Obama —, casualties reached their highest, both in terms of fatalities and wounded. The situation improved slightly in 2011, the number of deaths totaled 566, or less 20% than the year before, and the downward trend continued slowly through 2014.

The apparent slowdown of war intensity is due to a combination of different factors. First, the disengagement of NATO/ISAF coalition members, disheartened by the sky-high costs of the operation, by the lack of results both in the military and in the political fronts after a 10-year plus long belligerence, and by the shortage of workable options to try and get out of the Afghan quagmire without losing face. Second, the strategy shift on the part of the insurgents, more intent on creating a vacuum around the coalition forces than on striking an enemy increasingly eager to avoid face-to-face confrontation. Thirdly, the assumption of a combat role by the 350,000-strong Afghan security forces themselves, to try and check the spreading insurgent attacks in many parts of the country in 2014. Afghan forces have already been leading the fight, losing more than 5,000 in 2014 alone, the highest toll since the war began. In comparison, the international coalition has suffered a total of 3,485 deaths since 2001.

The withdrawal of the coalition combat forces started in 2011 and, according to the NATO announcement of November 2011, should be completed until the end of 2014. The US pulled out 10,000 troops by the end of 2011, and another 23,000 by September 2012, and downsized their air power, thus reducing their strike capability. By the end of 2014, at the official closure of the war, approximately 10,800 US forces remained in Afghanistan.

Other NATO member states, caught in the claws of a deep financial and economic crisis, discouraged by the scanty results achieved, and concerned with the prospects of a public opinion rousing and domestic political troubles, also withdrew their forces, transferring the responsibility of the fight to the Afghan army and police. About 12,000 troops will form part of the new NATO mission, named Resolute Support, largely restricted to training, advising and assisting the Afghan forces.

Afghanistan war is the longest one of the last 200 years. It provides a sad illustration of the little use that nation leaders have for history. Voters should be well advised to audition candidates to top offices, and check their acquaintance with, for instance, Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, especially where he describes how Athenians launched the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition (415 BC), literally digging the grave of the powerful Athens itself as a city-state, as a sea power and as the cradle of democracy. It would have been most beneficial for all and everyone that western leaders were more insightful about the 19th century lose-lose "Great Game" between the British and the Russians in the Afghanistan grounds, and took due notice of Field Marshal Montgomery's warning : "Don't go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia".

Sources: Afghanistan: Coalition Fatalities and US DoD - Defense Casualty Analysis System.

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