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# US Government Deficit and National Debt 1929-2019

Federal budget deficits have been feeding government debt since the early 1980s. While GDP steadily grows from 1929 through 2013 at the average annual rate of 3.27% (doubling

time 21.5 years) (see Fig. 1), budget surpluses and deficits jump up and down, with increasingly deeper troughs, adding fast to а swelling government debt (average annual growth rate 5.55%. doubling time 12.8 years). Extending the analysis through 2019 US by using the budget estimates.

grows

GDP




Fig.1: US federal budget surpluses and deficits, US national debt, and US GDP, 1929-2019 (index 1929=100).

faster, 3.41%, and the debt a bit slower, 5.53%. The gap between debt and GDP widens unflinchingly, self-feeding itself through further budget imbalances.

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### The 1971 Nixon Shock

In the post-WWII era, the high-deficit trend was launched by Nixon (see Table 1), who also devised a canny subterfuge to overcome, at least partially, its undesired consequences. Struggling with the costs of the Vietnam war and with a negative current account, Nixon ran a string of high-deficit budgets, with the consequence of growing the public debt. Obviously, the dollar shrunk, putting heat on foreign dollar holders to convert their reserves into gold at a fixed exchange rate, in conformance with the Bretton Woods system. That would mean hell for the US, a strong enough reason for Nixon to cancel the direct convertibility of the USD to gold, and to let the dollar float freely in the foreign exchange market. Quite a magic trick to pay debt with

funny money.

# Deepening deficits

Credit must be given to President Carter's efforts to balance the budget, but this did not last long. The highdeficit trend gained momentum during Reagan's presidency. Exception made of Clinton's second mandate, during which

the budget was balanced, thus allowing for a stabilization of the debt, the other presidencies have been extravagant spenders, the high end of prodigality being reached during G. W. Bush's mandates. The result is shown in the steep ascending line of government debt since 2001.

## Taxes won't help

In the context of a spending behavior stronger than the economy growth, any attempt to restore a balanced budget can only be achieved by means of massive cuts on spending, or substantial tax increases, or a combination of both — assuming that other radical measures are excluded, such as repudiating the government debt, or drastically relinquishing state responsibilities.

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diverging trends are explained by the dramatic

fall of the average interest rates: the US Daily

Treasury Long Term Composite rate data

gives 6.14% for 2000, and 3.41% for 2013

(beginning of the fiscal year). Declining

interest rates succeeded in checking the

adverse effects of the swelling debt. However,

if low interest rates yield to higher rates, the

impact on the budget can prove devastating.

A higher net interest burden implies the

reduction of public sector savings, meaning

less investment and slower growth of the

capital stock. Furthermore, as government

borrowing hits the "debt-limit" ceiling - de

facto raised to \$17.3 trillion following the debtlimit suspension of February 2014 -, the

ability of the federal government to finance its activities is impaired, and its fiscal difficulties

are exposed. Without enough money to pay

the bills, any of its payments are at risk,

An anemic economy, immersed in recession or sluggish growth as during the years since the 2008 financial meltdown, does not allow for tax raises to be very productive. High unemployment and compensation freezes hinder private incomes, and are not efficient tax feeders. Furthermore, on top of the social strain that high taxes place on the low-income strata of the population, they induce generalized consumption investment and restraint, thus causing still more foreclosures, more unemployment, lower incomes, lower tax revenues, and higher claims for government subsidies. The cure may prove worse than the evil.

## **Risks of a spiraling debt**

The alternative is to accept budget deficits on a regular basis. Alas, if the occasional deficit is not a cause for alarm, continued deficits may inflate an already huge government debt. High debt in itself may not be too bad, provided debt is used to finance a thriving economy fiscal capable of generating revenue outweighing the debt burden. But it may become a many-sided evil if and when debt grows faster than the economy, or if interest rates are higher than the economy growth rate, if low inflation does not erode the real cost of debt-related expenses, or if the national currency does not depreciate fast enough.

Debt carries interest, and high debt not only causes an increase of net amounts of interest spending, but, other things remaining equal, it also tends to induce higher interest rates, thus feeding further budget deficits. In spite of a gross federal debt increase from 31.7% in 1981, at the beginning of Reagan's mandate, to 100.6% of GDP in 2013, net interest as percent of GDP has fallen significantly from 2.2% to 1.3% of GDP in the same period. The


including all government spending, mandatory payments, interest on debt, and payments to US bondholders. Whereas a government shutdown would be disruptive, a government default could be

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#### Climbing social security and health care costs

The problem is compounded by the long-term prospects. Indeed, even under the assumption that the economy will recover, thus stimulating consumption, investment, job creation and reinvigorated tax revenues, and also assuming that the government will put a stop to the expensive overseas military operations. accounting for defense spending а representing 3.8% of GDP in 2013, it still remains that the heaviest spending category, i.e. mandatory spending (e.g. Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, deposit insurance, Medicaid, food stamps) amounted to 12.2% of GDP in 2013, and is forecast to

disastrous.



grow to 13.5% of GDP in 2019 (see Table 2).

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### An aging population

Projections of the US age pyramid alert to an aging population (see Table 3). People above 65 years of age were 13% of the total 2010 population, and will be 19% in 2025. Spending with retirement and Medicare programs will follow suit. Conversely, working age population aged 20 to 64, will decrease from 60% in 2010 to 56% of the total population in 2025, thus bringing the number of working age people that provide for one old-age beneficiary (inverse dependency ratio) from 4.73 to 2.99. The net result will be that, assuming contribution and payment rates remain the outlavs will inflate. while social same. insurance and retirement receipts (payroll significantly. taxes) will fall

The rapid growth of health care costs per capita inflate will also health-related government discretionary and mandatory programs, Medicare, spending (health Medicaid). The uncontrolled upwards trend of health care costs can be blamed to organic and management causes. On one hand, organic causes such as the longer life spans of individuals (the median age climbs from 36.7 years in 2010, to 38.9 years in 2015), as well as the ongoing progress of medical processes and technologies render health care services more lengthy, more widely available and more expensive for the government, the health insurers and the private pockets.


On the other hand, the management of the US medical system tends to make it inherently expensive, 40% to 100% more so than in other industrialized countries. A deficient health insurance coverage drives low-income patients to public hospital emergency services. Profit-oriented agents such as insurers and

health maintenance organizations (HMO) dominate the health care industry pushing margins and prices up. Statutory constraints, such as the mandatory civil liability insurance for physicians, commanding outrageously premiums, the government's priced or exclusion in the negotiations of medical services and drug pricing are an obstacle to economies of scale in Medicare and Medicaid. Notwithstanding the government claims that the Affordable Care Act or "Obamacare" - the program that arose the opposition's furor leading to the government "shutdown" on 1st October 2013 — should reduce the growth in health care spending, government is taking such saving steps as putting a freeze on payment rates for physicians in order to obtain net reductions of Medicare costs, the total programmatic spending is estimated at 14% of GDP by 2019. No slack is contemplated for this spending item.

# A weak dollar helps but is not enough

Fixing the federal fiscal problem will not be easy. Deficits will likely remain the rule, and debt will continue to pile up. There are however some good news for the US government. A little more than 37% of the government debt (see Table 4) is external debt, of which 82% is labeled in USD. By just letting the Federal Reserve continue printing dollar bills, the Nixon's free-float gimmick causes the USD value to erode against the major currencies, thus lowering the US government liabilities towards foreign holders of US securities. Between 2003 and 2013 the USD lost 28% of its value (composite exchange rate, weighted by the total US securities held by each of European Union, China. Japan. United Kinadom and Switzerland). At this rate, the 2013 government outstanding debt would shrink by





8.4% in ten years. This is hardly a solution, because the same outstanding debt has increased by 439% between 2003 and 2013. It is also to be feared that US creditors,

dissatisfied with the dollar decline, will repudiate the US currency as the dominant international payment currency, thus aggravating the US fiscal conundrum **O**.

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Source :

http://stats.areppim.com/stats/stats\_usxdeficitxdebtxgdp.htm



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			1929-2019		Governme	ent debt
	GD		Surplus or		outstan	
Year	USD billion 1	Index, 1929=100	USD billion 1	Index, 1929=100	USD billion 1	Index, 1929=100
1929 1930	1055.6 965.8	100 91.5	7410.4 7733.4	100 104.4	170.9 169.6	100 99.2
1931	904.1	85.6	-5395.9	-72.8	196.2	114.8
1932	787.5	74.6	-36182	-488.3	257.8	150.8
1933 1934	777.6 861.4	73.7 81.6	-35396.5 -46235.2	-477.7 -623.9	306.6 348.8	179.4 204.1
1934	938.2	88.9	-46235.2	-623.9	340.0	204.1
1936	1059.6	100.4	-53746.3	-725.3	421.8	246.8
1937	1113.6	105.5	-26250.9	-354.2	436	255.1
1938 1939	1076.7 1162.6	102 110.1	-1096.6 -35398	-14.8 -477.7	457.9 503	267.9 294.3
1940	1265	119.8	-35881.1	-484.2	528	308.9
1941	1488.9	141	-56871.5	-767.5	563.6	329.7
1942 1943	1770.3 2072	167.7 196.3	-218652 -556503.1	-2950.6 -7509.8	772.3 1394.4	451.8 815.8
1944	2237.5	212	-473864.1	-6394.6	2002.8	1171.7
1945	2215.9	209.9	-461814.1	-6232	2512.2	1469.7
1946 1947	1959 1937.6	185.6 183.6	-137036.7 31147.3	-1849.2 420.3	2316.8 2002.2	1355.4 1171.3
1948	2018	100.0	86620.6	1168.9	1852.6	1083.8
1949	2007	190.1	4266.6	57.6	1859.4	1087.8
1950 1951	2181.9 2357.7	206.7 223.4	-22668.8 41425.7	-305.9 559	1870.5 1732.7	1094.3 1013.6
1951	2357.7	223.4	-10136.1	-136.8	1/32./ 1729	1013.6
1953	2568.9	243.4	-42798.8	-577.6	1753.8	1026
1954	2554.4	242	-7536.1	-101.7 -259 3	1771.4	1036.3
1955 1956	2736.4 2794.7	259.2 264.7	-19217.9 24506.4	-259.3 330.7	1761.7 1693.5	1030.7 990.7
1957	2853.5	270.3	20503.6	276.7	1625.7	951
1958	2832.6	268.3	-16271	-219.6	1623.8	950
1959 1960	3028.1 3105.8	286.9 294.2	-74469.7 1720.7	-1004.9 23.2	1650.1 1636.8	965.3 957.6
1960	3105.0	294.2 301.7	-18856.7	-254.5	1636.0	957.6
1962	3379.9	320.2	-39915.1	-538.6	1665.6	974.4
1963 1964	3527.1 3730.5	334.1 353.4	-26269 -32176.5	-354.5 -434.2	1689.4 1695.7	988.3 992
1965	3972.9	376.4	-7537.4	-101.7	1694.8	991.5
1966	4234.9	401.2	-19214.4	-259.3	1662.2	972.4
1967 1968	4351.2 4564.7	412.2 432.4	-43640.5 -121862.7	-588.9	1647.2	963.6 984.8
1968	4304.7 4707.9	432.4	-121062.7 14965.6	-1644.5 202	1683.4 1632.8	964.6
1970	4717.7	446.9	-12462.2	-168.2	1626.5	951.5
1971	4873	461.6	-96115	-1297	1661.4	971.9
1972 1973	5128.8 5418.2	485.9 513.3	-93473.3 -56542.5	-1261.4 -763	1708.7 1737.6	999.6 1016.5
1974	5390.2	510.6	-21351	-288.1	1653.3	967.2
1975	5379.5	509.6	-169587.5	-2288.5	1698.3	993.6
1976 1977	5669.3 5930.6	537.1 561.8	-222627.5 -152557.4	-3004.3 -2058.7	1873.3 1986.9	1095.9 1162.4
1978	6260.4	593.1	-157227.1	-2121.7	2049.6	1102.4
1979	6459.2	611.9	-99941.1	-1348.7	2028.3	1186.6
1980 1981	6443.4	610.4	-166190.2	-2242.7 -2193.9	2043.2 2054.4	1195.3
1961	6610.6 6484.3	626.2 614.3	-162579.3 -248084.8	-2195.9 -3347.8	2054.4	1201.9 1295.1
1983	6784.7	642.7	-387524	-5229.5	2568.3	1502.5
1984	7277.2	689.4	-333844.2	-4505.1	2831.6	1656.6
1985 1986	7585.7 7852.1	718.6 743.9	-370507.1 -378437.5	-4999.8 -5106.8	3181.6 3635.6	1861.3 2126.9
1987	8123.9	769.6	-249762.3	-3370.4	3920.5	2293.5
1988	8465.4	802	-250093.5	-3374.9	4194.1	2453.6
1989 1990	8777 8945.4	831.5 847.4	-236796.5 -330669.5	-3195.5 -4462.2	4432.9 4837	2593.3 2829.8
1991	8938.9	846.8	-389810.2	-5260.3	5306.7	3104.5
1992	9256.7	876.9	-410963.4	-5545.8	5753.7	3366
1993 1994	9510.8 9894.7	901 937.4	-352645.7 -275077.5	-4758.8 -3712	6099.5 6353.1	3568.3 3716.7
1994	9694.7 10163.7	937.4 962.8	-2/50/7.5 -217425.7	-3/12 -2934.1	6596.3	3/16./ 3858.9
1996	10549.5	999.4	-139915.1	-1888.1	6804.6	3980.8
1997 1998	11022.9	1044.2	-28021.9	-378.1	6931.4 7000.1	4055
1998 1999	11513.4 12071.4	1090.7 1143.6	87745.7 156873.3	1184.1 2116.9	7000.1 7064.1	4095.2 4132.6
2000	12565.2	1190.3	288482.3	3892.9	6928.9	4053.6
2001	12684.4	1201.6	153088.4	2065.9	6933 7333 7	4055.9
2002 2003	12909.7 13270	1223 1257.1	-185479.8 -435236.4	-2503 -5873.3	7322.7 7818.9	4283.9 4574.2
2004	13774	1304.9	-463051.4	-6248.7	8278.8	4843.2
2005	14235.6	1348.6	-346062.1	-4670	8623.4	5044.8
2006 2007	14615.2 14876.8	1384.5 1409.3	-261744.6 -165100.9	-3532.1 -2228	8971.9 9254.3	5248.7 5413.9
2007	14870.0	1405.2	-462083.3	-6235.6	10101.9	5909.8
2009	14417.9	1365.8	-1412688	-19063.6	11909.8	6967.5
2010 2011	14779.4 15052.4	1400.1 1426	-1278885.7 -1259307.7	-17258 -16993.8	13399.4 14331.9	7838.9 8384.4
2011 2012	15052.4	1426 1465.6	-1259307.7 -1035183.1	-16993.8 -13969.3	14331.9	8384.4 8951.3
2013	15761.3	1493.1	-637503.3	-8602.8	15971.1	9343.4
2014 <sup>2</sup> 2015 <sup>2</sup>	17332.3	1641.9	-648805	-8755.3	17892.6	10467.5
2015 <sup>2</sup> 2016 <sup>2</sup>	18219.4 19180.6	1726 1817	-563564 -531126	-7605 -7167.3	18713.5 19511.6	10947.7 11414.7
2018 <sup>2</sup>	20199.4	1913.5	-457827	-6178.2	20261.7	11414.7
2018 <sup>2</sup>	21216.3	2009.9	-413289	-5577.1	20961.1	12262.6
2019 <sup>2</sup> verage nnual change ate (1929-	22196.1	2102.7	-502672	-6783.3	21670.7	12677.8
ate (1929- 013) Doubling time 1 years (1929-	3.27 %				5.55 %	
013) Average nnual change	21.5				12.8	
ate (1929- 1019) Doubling time	3.41 %				5.53 %	
n years (1929– 019)	20.7				12.9	

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Table 1: US budget surplus or deficit, government debt, and GDP.


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		US Projected Sp	ending in Major (Percent of GDI	Budget Categorie ?)	2S	
		Major Health	-	Defense	Nondefense	Other
	Social	Care		Discretionary	Discretionary	Mandatory
Date	Security	Programs	Net Interest	Spending	Spending	Spending <sup>1</sup>
2013	4.86	4.62	1.33	3.76	3.46	2.74
2014	4.89	4.85	1.31	3.45	3.38	2.51
2015	4.88	5.05	1.47	3.3	3.25	2.87
2016	4.88	5.37	1.69	3.19	3.04	2.85
2017	4.92	5.37	1.99	3.07	2.88	2.71
2018	5	5.28	2.34	2.97	2.79	2.57
2019	5.1	5.48	2.59	2.93	2.72	2.43
2020	5.2	5.58	2.79	2.88	2.67	2.39
2021	5.31	5.7	2.92	2.83	2.61	2.36
2022	5.42	5.95	3.05	2.8	2.56	2.38
2023	5.52	5.91	3.17	2.74	2.51	2.26
2024	5.62	5.88	3.27	2.67	2.47	2.16
Other mandato		all mandatory spe	ending other tha	n that for major h	ealth care program	rs, Social

Security and net interest.

Table 2: US projected spending in major budget categories.

			1	oulation by A exes, Thousa	0			
	20	10	20	15	20	20	20	25
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
20 to 64 years	182,468	60.0%	190,746	59.4%	193,392	57.9%	194,632	56.2%
65 years and over Total	38,613	12.7%	47,695	14.8%	55,969	16.8%	65,051	18.8%
population	304,280		321,363		333,896		346,407	
Median age	36.7		37.7		38.3		38.9	
Inverse old-								
age dependency								
ratio	4.73		4		3.46		2.99	



	US Government External Debt in Domestic Currency						
		Government Outstanding Debt			Government External Debt		Debt
		Billion USD	Billion USD	Percent in Domestic Currency	Billion USD	Percent of Outstanding Debt	Amount in Domestic Currency
	2003	6,760.0	6,712.6	76.78%	1,727.1	25.55%	1,326.0
	2004	· · · ·	7,957.5		,		1,726.0
	2005		9,246.0	78.93%			1,817.0
	2006		10,753.2		2,483.7		1,973.0
	2007	8,950.7	13,116.6		2,705.9		2,103.0
	2000	9,986.1	13,930.3	76.54%	3,104.1	31.08%	2,376.0
	2009		13,678.2		3,958.5		3,108.0
References :	2010	13,528.8	14,219.9		4,679.1		3,717.0
	2011	14,764.2					4,246.0 4,746.0
StatCounter Global Sta	ts inttp://	gs.staico	unter:con	<i>1/].</i> 81.19% 81.96%			4,746.0
Technology substitution	aon and the second seco	: http://st 438.70%	ats.arepr 238.70%	im.com/g			
Sources :	Composite exchange rate (weighted average of 5 big US securities holders, EU, Japan, China, UK, Switzerland) 2003 : 1 USD = 31,100 2013 : 1 USD = 22,498						, Switzerland)
<b>.</b>							

http://stats.areppim.com/stats/stats\_over/inchrubsterfiaedebPin domestic currency.